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INTRODUCTION
On April 17, 2019, United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
announced that the U.S. Government would allow a private right of
action to proceed against companies doing business in Cuba on
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confiscated property.1 Title III2 of the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity
Act of 19963 – better known as the “Libertad4 Act” or “Helms-Burton5,” permits U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the
Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959 to sue in the Federal
Courts anyone-regardless of nationality-who knowingly and intentionally “traffics” in that property.6 Preceding presidential administrations had suspended enforcement of Title III, citing the U.S. national interest in averting extraterritoriality and like violations of
International Law.7 However, with Title III in effect as of May 2,
20198 foreign and domestic defendants, now face litigation from Cuban Americans who seek compensation of their expropriated property.9
This comment examines the procedural contours of the private
right of action afforded to Title III litigants. From this perspective, it
argues that the federal courts will not be able to comport with the
Constitution in entertaining a Title III action. For one, the harms that
the statute seeks redress are not concrete injuries that are fairly traceable to the actions of those deemed liable. In other words, those
claimants invoking a right of action do not claim injuries that suffice
for standing, under Article III. 10 In addition, Title III grants the
courts exorbitant jurisdiction over those liable for trafficking in confiscated property, subjecting any and all defendants to unfair and arbitrary litigation that bypasses their liberty interests under the Fifth

* Luis D. Gutierrez received his business degree from Florida International University
in 2017 and his law degree from Marquette University in 2020. He thanks Professor Elana
Olson for her valuable insights and timely recommendations, all of which contributed to
this publication. He also thanks his colleagues, Julie Leary and Meaghan McTigue, for
their time and efforts in charting this publication along straight paths. Finally, he acknowledges that this publication was inspired by the political exile of his parents from Cuba in
the 1960’s. He is humbled by their journey and is grateful for his upbringing, teaching him
the value of open discourse and the freedom to question precepts.
1
See U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo’s Remarks to the
Press, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Apr. 17, 2019). https://www.state.gov/remarks-to-thepress-11/.
2
22 U.S.C. § 6081-6085 (2018)
3
Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, (1996).
4
Libertad in Spanish means liberty.
5
Supra, note 3 (named after bill co-sponsors Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and Dan
Burton (R-Indiana)).
6
22 U.S.C.A. § 6082 (2018).
7
See End of Suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act: Authorization of Claims Under
U.S. Law for “Trafficking in Certain Cuban Properties, CLEARY GOTTLIEB, (Apr. 19, 2019)
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/end-of-suspension-of--title-iii-of-the-helms-burton-act.
8
Id. at 3.
9
S. Kern Alexander, Trafficking in Confiscated Property in Cuban Property: Lender Liability under the Helms-Burton Act, 16 Dick J. Int’l L. 523, 538-546 (1998).
10
See U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, Cl. 2.
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Amendment Due Process Clause.11 All in all, this comment recommends that the federal courts sever Title III from the Libertad Act.
PERTINENT FEDERAL LAW AND EXECUTIVE DECISIONS
During the Spanish-American war, the U.S. and Cuba maintained a close diplomatic relationship.12 By the late 1950’s, North
Americans owned almost all the mines and cattle ranches in Cuba
and half of the nation’s sugar production.13 But, on January 1, 1959,
Fidel Castro assumed power in Cuba that deposed President Fulgencio Batista.14 Soon thereafter, American relations with Cuba began
to deteriorate when Castro aligned himself with the former Soviet
Union and agreed to sell sugar in exchange for oil and industrial
goods.15 President Dwight Eisenhower responded by barring the
sale of Cuban sugar in the U.S. Castro retaliated by nationalizing
foreign-owned businesses and confiscating property owned by
Americans without providing compensation.16 Fearing that Castro
would spread his communist agenda to Latin America, the U.S. engaged in an attempted invasion of Cuba, which backfired when the
1,400 Cuban exiles organized by the Central Intelligence Agency
were intercepted by Castro's forces as they landed.17 Thus, President
John F. Kennedy issued the Cuban Asset Control Regulations
(CACR’s), imposing a total economic embargo banning all trade with
and travel to Cuba, as a way to constrain Castro’s power.18 The
CACRs prohibit U.S. businesses and corporations from conducting
business with Cuba or Cuban Nationals and extend to transactions
involving property in Cuba or belonging to a Cuban national, unless
the transaction is licensed under the regulations. 19 They also prohibit travel to Cuba, with the exception of government officials traveling on official business and close relatives of Cuban nationals.20
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA)21 added several provisions

11

See U.S. Const. Amend. V (“No Person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of the law.”).
12
See John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the HelmsBurton Act, 20 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 747, 749 (Summer, 1997).
13
Id.
14
See Jeffrey Dunning, The Helms-Burton Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction for United
States Policy Toward Cuba, 54 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 213, 214 (1998).
15
Yoo, supra, note 12 at 750.
16
Id.
17
See Dunning, supra, note 14 at 215
18
See Lowenfeld, supra, note 9 at 420.
19
Yoo, supra, note 12 at 750.
20
Id.
21
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575, (1992).
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that fortified the embargo, particularly mandating that no licenses
are to be issued to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms.22
TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT
BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Once the Castro regime ceased trading with the U.S., it began
looking to the Soviet Union for massive economic subsidies.23 With
the official dissolution of the Soviet Union in September of 1991,
Cuba no longer received these subsidies and its economic output
dropped by an estimated fifty percent.24 Castro, responsible for reviving a struggling economy, invited foreign companies to invest in
joint ventures with the Cuban government, allowed for private enterprise in the form of self-employment and private farming, and legalized the use of U.S. currency by Cuban citizens.25 Many foreign
firms began to invest in Cuba with Castro’s blessing, including those
from Canada and the countries of the European Union, significant
U.S. trading partners.26 In addition, the Cuban government
amended and added articles to the Cuban Constitution, which permitted transfer of state-owned property to private ownership, limited public ownership of property to “social property,” and recognized certain ownership of mixed enterprises, economic societies
and like associations.27 These constitutional changes were meant to
assure foreign companies that Cuba was serious about engaging in
joint ventures.28 In response to these reforms, dissident groups
within Cuba called for the Castro regime to grant its citizens the
rights guaranteed to them by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Cuban Constitution.29 However, it was clear to U.S.
authorities that the majority of citizens supported the Communist
government, and that any prospects for an internal rebellion were
faint.30 Nevertheless, former Cuban citizens living in the U.S. continued to vehemently speak out and express their objections to Castro.31
Some of these Cuban exiles formed a humanitarian organization

22

Dunning, supra, note 14 at 215
Id. at 219.
24
Id. at 220.
25
Id. at 220-21.
26
Id. at 221.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. (Dunning notes that this conclusion was reached by “a group of experts commissioned by the Pentagon.”)
31
Id.
23
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known as Brothers to the Rescue, which devoted itself to helping Cuban refugees.32
Representative Dan Burton (R-I.N.) first introduced the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act in the House of
Representatives on February 14, 1995, and The House passed the bill
on September 21 by a vote of 294-130, garnering predominant support from Republicans and opposition from Democrats.33 The bill
was then introduced in the Senate by Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.),
who was said to be motivated by the lobbying influence of former
Cuban rum giant Bacardi, which would stand to become one of the
largest beneficiaries of the act.34 The Senate passed the bill, as
amended, on October 19, 1995, and it later agreed to the House's request for a conference committee on the bill35, where it received
widespread bipartisan support.36 The Clinton Administration was
initially opposed to the bill.37 In a letter to House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Secretary of State Warren Christopher noted that he was
deeply concerned about the act and that he would recommend that
the President veto the bill if passed by Congress.38 But, on February
24, 1996, Cuban fighter planes shot down two private planes chartered by Brothers to the Rescue, claiming that they had violated Cuban airspace, killing all four American citizens aboard the planes.39
As a consequence, President Clinton bypassed a presidential veto
and signed the bill into law on March 12, 1996.40
Some members of Congress did not believe that the Act represented the most effective method of subverting the Castro regime.41
Prior to the final House vote, Congressman Jack Reed stated that,
while he supported the promotion of a democratic Cuba, the Libertad
Act was contrary to American foreign policy.42 He further noted that
it would increase tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, endangering

32

Id. at 221-22.
Dunning notes that the bill was passed in essentially the same form in which it was
signed into law. Id. at 222. Initially, support for the Act was split along party lines: Republicans supported the bill by a margin of 227-4, while Democrats voted against the bill
by a 125-67 margin. See Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 927, 104th Cong. (1996).
34
Dunning, supra note 14, at 222-23.
35
As amended, the bill passed by a 74-24 margin. Republican Senators supported the
bill by a 51-2 margin, while Democrats supported it by a narrow 23-22 margin. See Bill
Tracking Report, H.R. 927, supra note 33.
36
H.R. REP. NO. 468 (1996).
37
Dunning, supra, note 14, at 223.
38
Id. In correspondence to House Speaker Gingrich, Secretary Christopher added
that the Act would actually damage prospects for a peaceful transition and would jeopardize a number of key U.S. interests around the globe. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 419.
39
See Dunning, supra note 14 at 222; Yoo, supra, note 12 at 749.
40
See Dunning, supra note 14 at 223.
41
Id.
42
See 142 CONG. REC. E308-09 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Reed).
33
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a peaceful transition to democracy.43 He also pointed to a loophole,
which would encourage more, not less, foreign investment in Cuba.44
Nevertheless, the Libertad Act was construed with an intent to promote democratic change in Cuba.45 Ironically, it was introduced in
the House alongside the Free Trade with Cuba Act, which included
provisions that would remove the embargo, and any prohibitions
against travel to Cuba by United States citizens.46 It would have also
instituted negotiations with Cuba for the purpose of settling claims
of U.S. citizens, whose property had been expropriated by the Cuban
government.47
LEGISLATION
The Libertad Act is divided into four Titles, preceded by sections containing Findings, Purposes, and Definitions.48 Title III allows U.S. nationals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban
government, on or after January 1, 1959, to sue in U.S. courts anyone
– regardless of nationality – who knowingly and intentionally “traffics” in that property.49 Hence, the scheme of Title III is to confront
those who traffic in confiscated property that once belonged to U.S.
nationals with the prospect of litigation in the federal courts by creating a private right of action.50 Damages for an initial finding of
trafficking equal the value of the property in question, whereas ongoing trafficking exposes offenders to treble damages.51 “Trafficking” here, is not confined to its traditional legislative conception, concerning those transactions dealing in narcotics.52 Rather, it is defined
to include selling, transferring, buying or leasing the expropriated
property, in addition to engaging in commercial activity from using
or otherwise benefitting from confiscated property.53 Thus, under
Title III any person who traffics in Cuban property on which a U.S.
national bases a claim may be liable.54 A person traffics in confiscated property if that person: knowingly and intentionally – (1) sells,
transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or
43

Id.
Id.
45
See Dunning supra, note 14 at 223.
46
H.R. 883, 104th Cong. (1995).
47
Id.
48
Pub. L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6021.
49
22 U.S.C.A. § 6081-6085 (Aug. 1, 1996).
50
See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 425.
51
22 U.S.C.A. § 6082 (3)(C)(ii) (1996).
52
See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 425.
53
Id.
54
22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A) (1996) (emphasis added).
44
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holds an interest in confiscated property, (2) engages in a commercial
activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or
(3) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking through another
person, without the authorization of any United States national who
holds a claim to the property.55 The extension of liability to not just
persons who directly control or operate expropriated property, but
also to persons who benefit profit from, or have an interest in the
property would appear to sweep in a variety of tangential players.56 For instance, banks that lend to businesses operating with expropriated property are most likely covered, at least to the extent that
they maintain a security interest in revenue derived from such property.57 Some companies with no direct connection to Cuba may also
benefit or profit from trafficking if they are closely related to a corporate affiliate that uses expropriated property in its business.58 The
parent company of a wholly-owned subsidiary trafficking in expropriated property, for example, may become implicated.59
Title III’s private right of action is especially powerful in its
allocating damages.60 Once liability is established, defendants must
compensate plaintiffs for the full value of the expropriated property,
as measured by the greatest of: (1) the value assigned to the property
by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), if the action
was based on an FCSC certified claim; (2) the current fair market
value of the property; (3) the fair market value of the property at the
time of expropriation, with compounding interest; or (4) a value determined by the court.61 Any such damages can be tripled when the
lawsuit is based on a certified FCSC claim or the defendant continues
to traffic in confiscated property 30 days after the plaintiff has provided notice of the action.62 The cause of action is available to persons who filed claims with the FCSC, thus persons who were U.S.
nationals at the time of confiscation.63 It is also available to Cuban
exiles who became or had become U.S. nationals by the effective date

55

22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(i)-(iii) (1996).
See Dunning, supra note 14, at 232.
57
See Alexander, supra note 9, at 546.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
22 U.S.C. § 6082 (1996).
61
22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)(I-III) (1996).
62
22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3) (1996).
63
See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 426.
56
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of the Act, March 12, 1996.64 This provision also enables children
born in the U.S. that succeeded to their parents’ claims to file suit.65
But, as a compromise, Congress delegated authority to the
President to suspend Title III in six-month intervals if they determine
and report to Congress that suspension (1) is necessary to the national interests of the U.S. and (2) will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. The suspension may be extended for additional periods of six months upon further determinations of the same, even as
the act remains in effect. 66 This compromise was accepted at the request of the executive branch “in order to afford the president flexibility to respond to unfolding developments in Cuba.”67 However,
Conference Committee noted that President Clinton would not have
been able to make, in good faith, the two determinations required for
suspension, because suspension would remove a significant deterrent to investment in Cuba, “thereby helping prolong Castro’s grip
on power.”68 Acknowledging the strong opposition from close allies
and documenting concerns about violations of international law,
President Clinton suspended Title III on July 16, 1996, defusing tensions with trading partners angered by the law.69 He continued to
suspend Title III throughout the tenure of his presidency, in part to
prevent the European Union from pursuing its objections to the Libertad Act in the World Trade Organization.70 Presidents Bush,
Obama and Trump would also invoke their suspension authority
every six months citing the U.S. national interest. 71
The Trump administration would become the first to contemplate a full suspension of Title III.72 On January 16, 2019, that
State Department announced that it would suspend the right of action for 45 days only, in order to conduct a “careful review.”73 The
Department further noted that it would review “the national interests of the United States and efforts to expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba and include factors such as the Cuban regime’s brutal
oppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms and its indefensible support for increasingly authoritarian and corrupt regimes
64

Id.
Id.
66
22 U.S.C. § 6085(c)(1)-(2) (1996).
67
Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 426.
68
Id.
69
President William Jefferson Clinton, Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995 (July 16, 1996).
70
See Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 7, at 3.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
What is the Helms-Burton Act, and Why does Article III Matter?, TRT World, at 2. (Mar.
14, 2019), https://www.trtworld.com/americas/what-is-the-helms-burton-act-and-whydoes-article-iii-matter-24946..
65
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in Venezuela and Nicaragua.”74 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Cuba condemned the announcement, noting that if Title III were to
be applied, “each and every Cuban and community in the country
will bear witness to the way in which the lawsuits are filed before
U.S. courts claiming for the ownership of the house they live in, the
workplace they work at, the school their children attend, the polyclinic where they are provided with medical care, and the parcels
where their neighborhoods have been built.”75 Cuba’s Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez added that Title III’s flagrant extraterritoriality and harm “would arbitrarily put third country companies under
U.S. Courts” and that the Libertad Act was “illegal, inapplicable and
void of any legal effect.”76 Still, the Trump administration persisted
on its path towards not invoking its suspension authority when Secretary Pompeo chose to only partially suspend Title III in March of
2019, allowing U.S. Nationals to bring action against Cuban entities
and sub-entities on the Cuba Restricted list for 30 days.77 He would
extend the suspension, under the same exceptions, for two weeks in
early April.78 Subsequently, Secretary Pompeo would announce, and
then-U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton would outline the
full implementation of Title III’s right of action.79 As of May 2, 2019,
Title III would no longer be suspended.80
TITLE III RECOGNIZES LIABILITY THAT DOES NOT ALLOW
PLAINTIFFS TO MAINTAIN STANDING UNDER
ARTICLE III.
The Constitution limits federal courts jurisdiction to actual
“cases or controversies.”81 Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the
traditional understanding of a case or controversy and it limits the
category of litigants who may bring a lawsuit in federal court.82 To
have standing, a plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in-fact, (2)
that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant and
(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.83
Thus, any case where the plaintiff ceases to meet all three
74

Id.
Id. at 3.
76
Id.
77
Zachary Cohen and Jennifer Hansler, Trump Expected to Become first President to Target
Cuba
with
this
Controversial
Policy,
CNN.com
(Apr.
17,
2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/16/politics/us-cuba-title-iii-venezuela/index.html.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
82
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
83
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
75
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requirements for constitutional standing no longer presents a live
case or controversy and the federal courts should dismiss it for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.84 Standing is perhaps the most important jurisdictional requirement as without it, the federal courts
would have no power to judge the merits.85 Here, Title III confers its
plaintiffs with an inadequate right of action that would yield no legal
standing. The harms that Title III seeks to redress are not concrete
injuries and even if they were, they are not fairly traceable to any sort
of commercial activity by the defendants that may have produced a
harm.
TITLE III HARMS DO NOT AMOUNT TO LEGAL INJURIES
The foremost standing requirement is injury in-fact, which
consists of an invasion of a legally protected interest that is, amongst
other considerations86, concrete.87 A concrete injury must be de facto,
meaning that it must be real and not abstract.88 Congress has the
power to define injuries that would allow a case or controversy to
mature.89 However, its role in identifying and elevating harms does
not mean that a plaintiff would automatically allege an injury-in-fact
whenever a statute authorizes that person to sue.90 Put simply, Congress cannot evade Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily
granting someone the right to sue when they would not have standing otherwise.91 In the context of Title III litigation, Congress clearly
intended to make those who traffic in expropriated property liable to
the U.S Nationals who once owned the property. It was prompted
to enact Title III because the remedies for (1) the wrongful confiscation of property by foreign governments; and (2) the subsequent unjust enrichment and economic exploitation of that property by foreign investors at the expense of the rightful owners were
ineffective.92 In so doing, it afforded plaintiffs a clear property interest.93 Yet, the commercial activities of any Title III defendant,
84
See Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2011).
85
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 420-21 (2013); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982).
86
An injury in fact consists of “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is both
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
87
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998).
88
Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
89
Id. at 1549.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
22 U.C.S.A. § 6081(8) (1996).
93
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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specifically those that rise to the level of trafficking in expropriated
property, do not infringe on any such interests.
Critical to the pulse of any prospective Title III litigation is
that all such injuries originate in the confiscation of the property by
the Cuban Government. Hence, those defendants that would fall
within the purview of liability established by the statute are not culpable for the most significant harm to a plaintiff’s interests, that being the sovereign taking of the property. Therefore, the federal
courts would need to hold that there is a concrete harm in conducting
business on the property without obtaining consent or paying adequate compensation to its original owner.94 But articulating as much,
here, would not align with federal law. At the outset, any cause of
action alleging unjust enrichment and trespass is predicated on the
ongoing ownership of property.95 Title III, meanwhile, merely provides a right of action to those U.S. Nationals who own a claim to
confiscated property in Cuba, without explicitly granting nor acknowledging full legal title.96 Further, the Supreme Court has recognized the power of the Cuban government to expropriate property
within its borders and to vest such rights in Cuba, even when the
sovereign fails to compensate former owners.97 Thus, in carrying a
claim to confiscated property that does not vest a full legal title, Title
III plaintiffs are not injured when they do not receive and are not
entitled to receive commissions stemming from business derived on
the property.
EVEN IF THESE HARMS WERE DEEMED INJURIES, THEY ARE
NOT FAIRLY TRACEABLE TO THE TRAFFICKING THAT
INCURS LIABILITY
To establish standing, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the
injuries sustained are fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct,
94
See Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., Slip Copy at 9, (S.D. Fla. 2020) (holding
that a Title III injury was concrete, because while the injury may have had its origin in the
confiscation, the Defendant did not explain how the continued use of the Subject Property
made the Plaintiff's harm any less tangible. Stated otherwise, Plaintiff's injury was real
because it was not receiving the benefit of its interest in the Subject Property, and Defendant's subsequent trafficking in the confiscated property has undermined Plaintiff's right to
compensation for that expropriation); Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises Sa Co., Slip
Copy at 8, (S.D. Fla. 2020) (holding along same rationale); Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd., Slip Copy at 8 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (holding along identical
rationale).
95
See Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A., 365 F.Supp.2d 1263, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
96
22 U.S.C. §§ 6082(a)(1)(A) (1996); Glen, 365 F.Supp.2d at 1269.
97
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 414–415 (1964) (implementing
the “Act of State” Doctrine and holding that territorial property rights are vested in a respective sovereign.)
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meaning that the injuries are connected with the conduct of they
complain.98 Yet, proximate causation is not a requirement of Article
III standing as harms that flow indirectly from the action in question
can be said to be fairly traceable to that action.99 Thus, a plaintiff may
be able to satisfy Article III standing even if the allegations pertaining
to the chain of causation are weak on the merits.100 Meeting these
requirements is especially pertinent when Congress defines the injuries and articulates the chains of causation that give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before.101
In Title III, Congress attempted to recognize a causal link between a claimant’s injury from the Cuban Government’s expropriation of their property and a subsequent trafficker’s unjust enrichment
from the use of that property.102 But, in delineating traceability, it
does not properly attribute the harm excised upon its plaintiff’s legal
interests to the conduct that renders a defendant liable. To the contrary, the causal chain of any such liability starts and ends with the
Cuban sovereign, as the nation was entirely responsible for both confiscating and expropriating the property. Traceability to the defendant is significantly curbed when the statute allocates money damages
in an amount equal to the sum of a claim certified by the FCSC, by a
special master determining the amount or ownership of a claim, or
by the fair market value of the property.103 Essentially, Title III makes
no connection between the value of the property on which the claim
is based and the value of the enrichment on which the assertion of
trafficking rests, grounding the legal harm solely in the confiscation
and expropriation by the Cuban Government.104 In determining that
Title III does not articulate a coherent chain of causation between the
harm to the plaintiff’s property interests and the defendant’s trafficking, it follows that any like liability is not fairly traceable to a defendant doing business on the contended property.

98

Trump v. Hawai'i, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018).
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 134, n.6 (2014).
100
See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1997).
101
Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
102
See David P. Fidler, Libertad v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act from
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TITLE III FORGOES DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND IS THEREFORE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
When Congress creates liability, it must act within its delegated
constitutional powers and not infringe on constitutionally protected
rights.105 The Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate U.S. commerce with foreign nations106, allowing it to regulate foreign conduct
that has substantial or intended effects on commerce.107 But, any implementation of liability must still answer to the Bill of Rights.108 This
limitation would entitle foreign defendants to receive Fifth Amendment Due Process protection with respect to exercises of personal jurisdiction by the federal courts.109 Title III disregards any such protection when imposing liability on any person that traffics110 in
property confiscated by the Cuban Government when it merges subject matter jurisdiction over the trafficking that arises from expropriated property in Cuba with personal jurisdiction over those deemed
liable. As a consequence, the right of action creates personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it, specifically in violation of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.111
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PROTECTS
THE SAME LIBERTY INTEREST AS THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
The extraterritorial application of law by U.S. states is subject to
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process limits, and that such
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application therefore cannot be unreasonable or fundamentally unfair.112 Thus, a state may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if that defendant has certain
minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.113 From this conception of fair play and substantial justice,
courts may acquire personal jurisdiction in either one of two ways.
First, the courts may exercise specific jurisdiction over its defendants
when a lawsuit “arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum.”114 Second, courts may assert general jurisdiction
over its defendants when their operations within the forum are so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from these activities.115 In other words, a court may hear any and all claims against
these defendants “when their affiliations with the forum are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the
forum.”116
Yet, in Daimler AG v. Bauman117, the Supreme Court also noted
that to approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every state in
which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business would be unacceptably grasping.118
There, twenty-two residents of Argentina filed suit against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellscheft (Daimler), a German public stock
company, in the Northern District of California.119 The complaint alleged that Mercedes-Benz of Argentina (MB Argentina), a subsidiary
of Daimler, collaborated with state security forces, during Argentina’s “Dirty War” to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina workers, among them, plaintiffs or persons closely related to
plaintiffs.120 In asserting claims under the Alien Tort statute and the
Torture Victim Protection Act, the complaint noted that personal jurisdiction was predicated on the California contacts of MercedesBenz, LLC. (MBUSA), another Daimler subsidiary that was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey.121 It cited that MBUSA had distributed Daimler-manufactured
112
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vehicles to independent dealerships throughout the U.S., including
California.122 However, the Court held that Daimler was not, in fact,
amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by conduct of MB Argentina that took place entirely outside of the U.S.123 It
reasoned that, even in assuming that MBUSA qualified as at home in
California, Daimler’s affiliations were not sufficient to subject it to
the general jurisdiction of the forum, especially when the claims by
the foreign plaintiffs had nothing to do with anything that occurred
or had its principal impact in California.124 Thus, it cautioned that if
Daimler’s California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of the
Argentina-rooted case in California, it would sanction a grasping
view of general jurisdiction.125 It concluded that exercises of personal
jurisdiction so exorbitant, would be barred by due process constraints on the assertion of adjudicatory authority.126
Critical to any exercise of personal jurisdiction post-Daimler is
that the federal courts should entertain it when it is reasonable.127
This principle is exemplified by the fact that personal jurisdiction
represents a restriction on judicial power as a matter of individual
liberty.128 Therefore, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments place the
same limits upon the unreasonable exercise of personal jurisdiction
that would violate due process.129 Both clauses use the same language to preserve the same liberty interest, that is to be free from
arbitrary litigation130, which would hale individuals and corporations outside of the forum directly into the forum, and the only distinction that exists between both clauses is when the Fifth Amendment is implicated, indicating that the courts would look to
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examining a defendant’s contacts with the U.S. as a whole, rather
than the local forum.131
Hence, in protecting personal rights, the Fifth Amendment Due
Process clause limits the extraterritorial application of federal law as
the Fourteenth Amendment limits like state actions.132 Essentially, it
shields individuals from arbitrary government actions, rather than
divesting government of the competence to act.133 Although the
Court has yet to speak definitively on this proposition as the question
remains open,134 it is clear that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
standards for jurisdiction are the same.135 Therefore, the federal
courts should enshrine Daimler into the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause, where jurisdiction over foreign defendants will only be
reasonable when the contacts of the defendant with the U.S. are so
continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in
the forum.136 Legislation that authorizes the exercise of any such jurisdiction outside of this setting should be ruled unconstitutional.
TITLE III GRANTS THE FEDERAL COURTS UNREASONABLE
JURISDICTION OVER ITS DEFENDANTS
Where personal jurisdiction recognizes and protects the individual liberty interest of defendants, subject matter jurisdiction concerns
the character of the controversies over which federal judiciary
131
See Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2016). Pertaining to Title
III litigation, the courts will either aggregate national contacts or assess local contacts based
on the Defendant being hailed into court. Specifically, Title III adopts 28 U.S.C. § 1608
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 523
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authority may extend.137 Thus, any legislation that grants the federal
courts broad subject matter jurisdiction does not correlate to a tantamount exercise of personal jurisdiction.138 Prescribing as much
would be contrary to Supreme Court precedent, which has made
clear that subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are
separate legal requirements that serve distinct purposes.139
Title III conflates personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction when imposing liability on any person that traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban government.140 The right of action
swings wide open the courthouse door to claimants without expressing any clear reservations as to the defendants that may be hauled
into court. Rather, any and all limitations on the cases or controversies presented to the courts are limited to a $50,000 amount-in-controversy requirement141 and a two-year statute of limitations.142
Other pertinent limitations concern the termination of rights, particularly the President’s suspension authority.143 However, in line with
an objective to affect the behavior of persons in third countries who
have done or are considering doing business in or with Cuba144, Title
III does not delineate any exceptions, limitations, or protections that
temper an otherwise unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction.
While a defendant here may be at liberty to raise a motion to
dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction145, Title III should not stand
when the deprivation of the defendant’s liberty interest is plain on
the face of the statute. Its construction of liability mandates the federal courts to hear any and all claims where any person traffics in
confiscated property. Assessing such motions on a case-by-case,
fact-sensitive basis would run contrary to the letter of the law, which
does not allow courts to discriminate as to the class of defendants
that may be found liable for trafficking.146 But, even more problematic to judicial economy is when a court denies a motion to dismiss
on the basis that any constitutional arguments as to the lack of
137
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jurisdiction could still be adjudicated on the merits.147 Title III does
not afford its defendants the opportunity, as the defendants that lose
on a pretrial motion to dismiss are certain to lose at trial.
Thus, the outcome of any such case is wholly contingent on aggregating the defendant’s contacts148 with the U.S., as opposed to litigating the merits substantiating the right of action. Title III is therefore unconstitutional, since it entangles the federal courts’ personal
jurisdiction over the defendant with the merits of the controversy.149
Recognizing that foreign defendants cannot be subjected to an exorbitant exercise of personal jurisdiction that is unreasonable and unfair150, the private the right of action is in violation of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.
THE FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD SEVER TITLE III FROM THE
LIBERTAD ACT

When enacting legislation, Congress sometimes expressly addresses severability, as it may include a severability clause in the law
making clear that the unconstitutionality of one provision does not
affect the rest of the law.151 When Congress does include an express
severability clause, the federal courts should adhere to the text of the
clause, because it leaves no doubt about what the enacting Congress
wanted if one provision of the law were later declared unconstitutional.152 A severability clause indicates that Congress “did not intend the validity of the statute in question to depend on the validity
of the constitutionally offensive provision.”153 Although a litigant
may argue that the text of a severability clause does not reflect Congress’s actual intent as to severability, courts today are more likely to
acknowledge the text of a severability clause as indicative of
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congressional intent.154 Congress included a severability clause in
the Libertad Act, which states that if any provision of the act, or the
application to any person is held invalid, the remainder of the act or
its application to other persons not similarly situated would not be
affected by the invalidation. 155
Thus, the Act expressly permits the federal courts to sever Title
III upon holding that the right of action is unconstitutional. Severing
would also be aligned with the holistic intent of the passing Congress. The Libertad Act was not passed to stimulate complex litigation in the U.S. nor to compensate investors hurt by the Cuban Revolution.156 Granting the President suspension authority over Title
III157 demonstrates that the right of action is not critical to the act’s
purported ends. All in all, twenty-three years elapsed from the effective date of Title III, the conclusion of the three-month grace period, and the rescission of a presidential suspension before claimants
were able to file suit under Title III.158 Conversely, the rescission of
the suspension and the subsequent availability of the right of action
contemplates other due process considerations,159 especially pertinent if the current administration or any succeeding administration
were to once again suspend Title III. For this very reason, it is imperative that the Federal Courts speak affirmatively as to the unconstitutionality of Title III. Deferring to the President’s conferred discretion to suspend would do nothing to ease the liability that is
currently imposed on those deemed to be trafficking in expropriated
property. Further, any such right of action that can yield damages
would be subject to the whims of a sitting administration, thereby
designating the enactment of the right of action a mere political question.160 The federal courts should address Title III in a live case or
controversy. In so doing, they should strike it down as unconstitutional and sever it from the Libertad Act.
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CONCLUSION
As a shining city on a hill, the United States seeks to exemplify
the virtues of its democracy at home and instill those principles
abroad. Title III charts a noble endeavor towards honoring one’s fundamental right to own and property, which is enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution. Furthermore, in the interest of the Cuban people, it is
invested in the Cuban government respecting the property rights of
its nationals. But, when enacting Title III, the U.S. ignored its own
constitution of norms, mores, and values in creating and exacerbating exorbitant encroachments into one’s personal liberties without
regard for due process. Therefore, the federal courts should sever
Title III from the Libertad Act, in recognition of true liberty for all.

